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EUTHANASIA: ORCHESTRATING "THE LAST SYLLABLE
OF... TIME"
Stephen A. Newman*
INTRODUCTION

Taboos and unwritten social rules surrounding death, suicide and
euthanasia have strangled candid discussion of these related topics for
many years. Euthanasia-acting to produce a merciful death-has
been a matter for whispered conversation among doctors, occasionally
practiced 1 but only recently publicly raised as a matter for "proper"
debate.
The grip of silence has been dramatically broken by various
events, most notably:
" the publication in a 1988 issue of the Journalof the American Medical Association of an article by an anonymous doctor recounting
his administration of a lethal dose of morphine to a woman dying of
2
ovarian cancer, entitled It's Over, Debbie
"

"

a statement published in the New England Journal of Medicine in
1989 by ten doctors associated with the nation's leading hospitals
and medical schools declaring their belief that "it is not immoral for
a physician to assist in the rational suicide of a terminally ill
person"
the publication in 1991 in the New England Journal of Medicine of

* Professor of Law, New York Law School. I would like to thank Ms. Karen A. Cornelius
for her invaluable research assistance. I also gratefully acknowledge the excellent library support
services provided by Mr. Leslie Kanocz of the Mendik Library at New York Law School.
The title of this article is partly borrowed from William Shakespeare:
Tomorrow, and tomorrow, and tomorrow
Creeps in this petty pace from day to day
To the last syllable of recorded time

Macbeth, Act V, scene v.
1. Lawrence K. Altman, Use of Suicide Device Sets in Motion Debate On A Disturbing
Issue, N.Y. TIMEs, June 12, 1990, at C3.
2. It's Over, Debbie, 259 JAMA 272 (1988).
3. Sidney H. Wanzer et al., The Physician'sResponsibility Toward Hopelessly Ill Patients:
A Second Look, 320 N. ENG. J. MED. 844, 848 (1989) (two of the twelve doctor-authors dissented
from this opinion).
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a detailed account by Dr. Timothy Quill of his decision to help a
patient suffering from leukemia to commit suicide4
" the widely publicized death of Janet Adkins, a woman suffering
from Alzheimer's disease who used a suicide machine devised by Dr.
Jack Kervorkian, a retired pathologist, to end her life5
" the publication of a suicide manual called Final Exit by a small
publishing house that remarkably zoomed to the top of a major national best seller list8
All of these events provoked wide commentary in public and professional arenas, in marked contrast to the near silence that prevailed
7
previously.
The significance of the articles in the New England Journal of
Medicine and the Journal of the American Medical Association can
hardly be overestimated. As gatekeepers and arbiters of materials
deemed fit for widespread, serious discussion by the nation's physicians,
the two leading journals of the medical profession signaled that open
discussion of euthanasia is now acceptable. In the Quill article the author described and took responsibility for an act of assisted suicide. The
fact that the account was signed rather than anonymous added further
to the respectability of the discussion.
Voluntary euthanasia, commonly performed at the request of an
individual suffering from catastrophic disease, is a version of suicide
done with the assistance of others. Responses to suicide historically
have been harsh, with penalties ranging from refusal of traditional burial and confiscation of property to exposure of the corpse to scavenging
animals and criminal punishment for unsuccessful suicide attempters. 8
Even in modern times, suicide is often denied, disguised as an accident,
4. Timothy E. Quill, Death and Dignity: A Case of Individualized Decision Making, 324 N.
691 (1991).
5. William E. Schmidt, ProsecutorsDrop Criminal Case Against Doctor Involved in Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1990, at 10; James Risen, Death & the Doctor: Dr. Jack Kevorkian
Has Long Taken An Interest In the Dying. But Did He Go Too Far in Assisting A Suicide?, L.A.
TIMES, June 21, 1990, at El.
6. Lawrence K. Altman, How to Book on Suicide is a Top Best-Seller, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9,
1991, at A10.
7. Although excellent works appeared over the years, see, e.g., GLANVILLE L. WILLIAMS.
THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1957); Yale Kamisar, Some Non-Religious
Views Against Proposed 'Mercy-Killing' Legislation, 42 MINN. L. REV. 969 (1958); James
Rachels, Active and Passive Euthanasia,292 N. ENG. J. MED. 78 (1975), none sparked the substantial public debate we have today.
ENG. J. MED.

8.

GEORGE H. COLT, THE ENIGMA OF SUICIDE

285 (1991).
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unreported in obituaries, and kept "within the family." 9 Part of the
reticence about euthanasia can be traced to the social opprobrium that
attaches to suicide.
The new openness in thought-no doubt motivated by a dread of
medical technology that draws life out to harrowing extremes-has led
to a serious movement to legalize euthanasia. An initiative to do so was
on the November, 1991 ballot in the State of Washington.10 Significant
efforts have also been made in other states,11 and public opinion polls
12
show surprisingly strong support for such proposals.
Major opposition to legal euthanasia comes from physicians and
right to life groups. 13 The debate promises to intensify in the years
ahead as proponents draw strength from the successes of the right to
die movement and opponents try to stem the public's enthusiasm for
euthanasia.
Since particular instances have the powerful effect of galvanizing
debate on public issues in America, it is worth taking special note of
three of the above-listed events that involved individuals whose deaths
were hastened by physicians. I will discuss these events first.
Next I will consider the key questions generally raised in the controversy over the legalization of euthanasia. To date, the answers offered too often consist of poorly supported predictions about the future
consequences of a limited euthanasia policy. Little consideration is
given to other, sometimes more plausible outcomes.
It is important for all participants in the controversy to keep in
mind the uncertainty that marks any position taken on the best course
for future social policy. Medical, legal and social science expertise stops
short of predicting the future. Calculated risks are an unavoidable part
of every public policy decision-including the decision to maintain the
status quo.
"It's Over Debbie"
Few articles in the staid Journalof the American Medical Associ9.

Paul Gewirtz, A Lawyer's Death, 100 HARV. L. REv. 2053 (1987).

10. See Courtney S. Campbell, To Die in Wa.,

HASTINGS CENTER REP.,

Mar.-Apr. 1991, at

3. The initiative was rejected by the citizens of Washington by a 54 percent to 46 percent vote.
John Gross, Voters Turn Down Mercy Killing Idea, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1991, at B16.
11. See Allen Parachini, The California Humane and DignifiedDeath Initiative, HASTINGS
CENTER REP.,

Special Supp. Jan.-Feb. 1989, at 10.

12. See 1991 Roper Poll of the West Coast, 44 Hemlock Quarterly 9 (1991) [hereinafter
1991 Roper Poll]; Louis HARRIS, INSIDE AMERICA 154-158 (1987).
13. See Parachini, supra note 11.
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ation (JAMA) have stirred such visceral responses as the brief essay
entitled "It's Over, Debbie."' 14 In this essay, an unnamed young resident on call at a large private hospital receives a late night phone call
summoning him to the bedside of a twenty-year-old woman named
Debbie. From a scan of the patient's medical chart and a hurried conversation with the nurse, he learns that Debbie is dying of ovarian cancer. She has recurrent vomiting and her weight is down to eighty
pounds. Entering the room, he sees a hollow-eyed, emaciated woman,
looking much older than twenty. She is breathing heavily, starved for
air. An older woman is holding her hand. The resident recounts that
Debbie
had not eaten or slept in two days. She had not responded to chemotherapy and
was being given supportive care only. It was a gallows scene, a cruel mockery of
her youth and unfulfilled potential. Her only words.., were, "Let's get this over
with." 15

The resident prepares to administer a dose of morphine, thinking it
"will give her rest" and also expecting it will "do the job." He tells the
two women that he will "give Debbie something that would let her rest
and to say goodbye." The essay continues:
Debbie looked at the syringe, then laid her head on the pillow with her eyes
open, watching what was left of the world. I injected the morphine intravenously
and watched to see if my calculations on its effects would be correct. Within
seconds her breathing slowed to a normal rate, her eyes closed, and her features
softened as she seemed restful at last. The older woman stroked the hair of the
now sleeping patient. I waited for the inevitable next effect of depressing the
respiratory drive. With clocklike certainty, within four minutes the breathing
rate slowed even more, then became irregular, then ceased. The dark-haired woman stood erect and seemed relieved.
It's over, Debbie.' 6

Letters to JAMA from physicians generally condemned the doctor's behavior, often angrily, 17 and added their view that JAMA was
wrong to publish it. The editor of the Journal took to his own pages to
defend the decision to publish and to describe the unusually strong and
conflicting reactions the article sparked among doctors and members of
the public. He noted:
14.
15.
16.
17.

It's Over, Debbie, supra note 2.
Id.
Id.
See Letters, 259 JAMA 2094-2098 (1988).
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Most of the early letters were from physicians and tallied about 4:1 against the
action the physician described and 3:1 against THE JOURNAL for publishing
the essay. Reactions from the public and media were delayed but were extraordinary in volume and duration.
• While our early mail was heavily in opposition, our recent letters have
run strongly in favor of the act described by the physician and of THE JOURNAL'S courage in publishing about euthanasia. If physicians' letters are any
indication, mainstream physician involvement in active euthanasia is unlikely in
the near future. 8

The troubling aspects of Debbie's case are clear. The resident did
not know the patient, having knowledge of her only from the chart and
from a quick conversation with a nurse in the hallway. He acted on the
patient's ambiguous statement, "Let's get this over with." He did not
consult with the older woman in the room with Debbie; he did not even
ask who she was. He did not consult with the attending physician, who
presumably knew the patient, family, and case best and had primary
responsibility for it.
All of this is true. But there are other truths here as well. The
resident was faced with a patient in great distress. Her suffering was
quite apparent. Her doctors had already made the decision to limit
medical attention to supportive care only; she was to be allowed to die.
The tragedy's end was already written. It had only to be acted out by
the patient.
Allowing nature to run its course was supposedly the humane
thing to do so as not to prolong dying when the case was hopeless.
Nevertheless, her dying was prolonged. How humane was it to let her
suffer for days, without the relief of sleep, brutalized by her disease,
with (presumably) her mother holding her hand? How many hospital
caregivers had walked by this tableau of suffering and thought "the
sooner the end comes, the better?" How many had simply decided not
to think about it at all?
Debbie had been treated with chemotherapy. If treatment had
worked only to slow the inexorable progress of the disease, then doctors
had only contributed to drawing out her death. Doing nothing while the
torment continued seems more like letting her suffer than letting her
die.
Debbie could not have been given relief without a clear danger to
her life. Even a modest dose of narcotic painkiller was enough to cause
18. George D. Lundberg, "It's Over Debbie" and the EuthanasiaDebate, 259 JAMA 2142
(1988).
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her death. If the young woman and her family wanted relief at any
cost, they should have had access to it.
Unfortunately, this resident made little effort to ascertain their
wishes. By relying instead on his own intuitions about their thoughts,
he took too much of the decision away from both patient and family
member.
The resident's failure to consult other doctors is more understandable. It is possible that this resident could anticipate the reaction of
doctors in his hospital to any suggestion of euthanasia. The ability to
block out others' suffering, a broad streak of self-righteousness, and an
overweening fear of even the most improbable legal involvement are,
unfortunately, some of the less-than-noble ingredients in the modern
medical psyche. 19 These traits can easily discourage the kind of doctorto-doctor consultations that raise sensitive moral and ethical issues in
decision making at the end of life.
"Diane" and Dr. Quill
Dr. Timothy Quill's sensitive and moving account of his aid to a
woman desiring suicide20 is a landmark in the euthanasia debate. His
patient, identified as "Diane," refused a stressful course of therapy
designed to combat her leukemia. The proposed treatment-which included chemotherapy and bone marrow transplants, with all the painful
side effects and consequences-would not guarantee her survival. The
mortality rate with treatment was in fact quite high. Some long term
cures did result, however, about 25 percent of the time. The outcome
without treatment was almost certain death.
Despite the possibility of a cure, Diane refused treatment. Quill
made sure she understood the options and the odds. He assured her of
his best effort to minimize her pain if she chose treatment, and as a
former hospice director he took this aspect of care very seriously. She
was nevertheless "convinced she would die during the period of treatment and would suffer unspeakably in the process (from hospitalization, from lack of control over her body, from the side effects of chemotherapy, and from pain and anguish). '2 1 Diane discussed the matter
extensively with her husband and college-age son. She talked to a psy19. Wanzer, The Physician'sResponsibility, supra note 3, at 955 (discussing doctors' fear
of improbable legal proceedings).
20. See Quill, Death and Dignity, supra note 4.
21. Id.
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chologist. She consulted with Dr. Quill, who came to agree that she
had made the right decision in refusing treatment.
Diane soon confronted her doctor with another decision. She
wanted to die when she no longer felt she could maintain a dignified
existence. Quill assured her of his belief in comfort care, in controlling
pain and lessening suffering as much as possible. But Diane "had
known of people lingering in what was called relative comfort, and she
wanted no part of it. When the time came, she wanted to take her life
in the least painful way possible. '22 Quill sympathized, but initially felt
he could not promise her his assistance. Yet, Dr. Quill recounted,
In our discussion, it became clear that preoccupation with her fear of a lingering
death would interfere with Diane's getting the most out of the time she had left
until she found a safe way to ensure her death. I feared the effects of a violent
death on her family, the consequences of an ineffective suicide that would leave
her lingering in precisely the state she dreaded so much, and the possibility that
a family member would be forced
to assist her, with all the legal and personal
23
repercussions that would follow.

After satisfying himself that she was rational and unwavering in
her decision, Quill suggested to Diane that she contact the Hemlock
Society, a group that supplies information on suicide. A week later,
when she requested sleeping pills, he had another conversation with her
to discuss her plans:
In our discussion it was apparent that she was having trouble sleeping, but it was
also evident that the security of having enough barbiturates available to commit
suicide when and if the time came would leave her secure enough to live fully
and concentrate on the present. It was clear that she was not despondent and
that in fact she was making deep, personal connections with her family and close
friends. I made sure that she knew how to use the barbiturates for sleep, and also
that she knew the amount needed to commit suicide. We agreed to meet regularly, and she promised to meet with
me before taking her life, to ensure that all
1
other avenues had been exhausted. '

Diane lived several more months. Toward the end, she experienced
weakness, bone pain, and fever. She faced a future that "held what she
feared the most-increasing discomfort, dependence, and hard choices
between pain and sedation. 25 She told Quill the time had come. Two
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.

25. Id.
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days later, after saying her goodbyes to friends and family at her home,
she used the pills to end her life.
Dr. Quill reported the cause of death as leukemia. He did not
mention suicide, wishing to avoid the involvement of police, an ambulance crew, the medical examiner's office, a criminal prosecutor-the
people society authorizes to invade the privacy and lives of those who
have suffered enough., But Dr. Quill's publication of his story and the
vast coverage it received in newspapers and the media led a county
prosecutor to present the case to a grand jury. The grand jury refused
to issue an indictment.26
Unlike many physician-authored accounts, in this one the patient,
not the doctor, is the principal character. Quill had a role to play in
Diane's life, but the drama that unfolded clearly was not his story but
her story. Quill accepted his diminished role without peevishness or loss
of self-esteem.
Quill's experience demonstrates that once the doctor gives up the
effort to control the patient's life, he is freer to participate in it on a
deeper level. Quill manifested his respect for Diane by attempting to
understand her and her stance toward the life and death questions she
faced. When Diane determined that she would rather end her life than
have her disease destroy it, Quill had to make a crucial decision about
his own role. He could have refused to discuss her suicide, discouraged
it as a matter of principle, cited the state law that makes assisting in
suicide a crime, or participated with what politicians call "deniability"
by prescribing the sleeping pills but speaking about them only as an
insomnia remedy.
Dr. Quill chose none of the above. He talked with Diane directly
about her suicide choice and offered his help in forestalling physical
pain. He kept the door open to other alternatives and struggled to comprehend her overwhelming final decision.
He decided he would support her to the fullest extent. It is impossible to read Quill's thoughtful and heartfelt account without feeling a
deep sense of his humanity and commitment to the care and not the
control of his patient.
26. Lawrence K. Altman, Jury Declines to Indict a Doctor Who Said He Aided in a Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 1991, at Al. Since the proceedings of the grand jury are secret, the
basis of its decision is not known. However, Dr. Quill did testify for several hours, and undoubtedly the grand jury was fully informed of what he did and why.
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KERVORKIAN AND JANET ADKINS

On June 4, 1990, Dr. Jack Kervorkian helped Janet Adkins, a

fifty-four-year-old woman with Alzheimer's disease, commit suicide.
He did so by means of a home-made suicide machine. It was described
by a Michigan judge as consisting
of a frame holding three chemical solutions that fed into a common intravenous
line, which was controlled by a switch and a timer ....

Mrs. Adkins herself

activated the switch that actually turned on the machine; however, he shook the
bottles containing the chemical solutions to ensure that the flow was correct.2 7

Kervorkian had never used the machine before. He was a retired
pathologist, intent on starting what he termed a
unique medical practice: to assist the rational suicide of patients who are suffering from imminently terminal illness, severely crippling or painful disease or deformity or trauma, and who, on their own, have decided that the quality of life
for them has degenerated to intolerable levels. Candidates for the service must be
alert and mentally competent, and their underlying condition must be physical
(not psychiatric).21

Kervorkian met once with Mrs. Adkins and her husband, videotaping the session. She appeared, in the words of the judge, "coherent,
responsive to verbal communication, and without significant, clinically
obvious physical or mental impairment; it was reported that she played
tennis within days of her induced death."2 9 Her doctor testified that she
might have survived for seven to ten more years. Upon autopsy, it appeared that the disease had in fact reached an advanced stage in her
brain.
Kervorkian faced two court proceedings; in one he was charged

with murder and in the other he fought against an injunction to restrain him from further use of his suicide device. The murder charge
was dismissed.30 In the civil case, Judge Alice L. Gilbert ordered
Kervorkian not to use the machine or in any other way to aid a patient
31
to commit suicide.
Judge Gilbert accused Kervorkian of self-promotion and sharply
27. People v. Kevorkian, No. 90-390963-AZ (Mich. Ct. Cl. Feb. 5, 1991), reprinted in 7
IssuEs IN L. & MED. 107, 108 (1991).
28. Id. at 110 (Letter from Kevorkian to Michigan Dept. of Licensing and Regulation).
29. Id. at 113.
30. Schmidt, supra note 5.
31. People v. Kevorkian, No. 90-3909637-AZ (Mich. Ct. Cl. Feb. 5, 1991), reprinted in 7
IssuEs IN L. & MED. 107 (1991).
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criticized his conduct as a physician. Rather than carefully assessing
the condition of his patient, she stated, he hastily agreed to take on
Mrs. Adkins as a subject for testing his experimental device. He did
not know Mrs. Adkins well; he did not confirm her diagnosis; he did
not explain the options she had and the possibility for new discoveries
about Alzheimer's on the scientific horizon. He lacked the training and
experience necessary to evaluate an Alzheimer's patient. Judge Gilbert
found that "it was, in fact, the patient ... who dictated the treatment
modality, and Dr. Kervorkian simply obliged.18 2 His patient was
"neither imminently terminally ill nor suffering pain," 33 although the
judge felt "it is probable that she did have sufficient mental impair4
ment to preclude the capacity to make the decision she made."'1
A very different light is shed on the matter in an account published by Myriam Coppens, who served as the Adkins' family therapist
for the last year of Janet Adkins' life. Ms. Coppens wrote:
I can ... assure you that Mrs. Adkins had a longstanding, voluntary, well-considered philosophy of life that included her wanting the option of a physician's
aid in dying in case of terminal illness or a disease such as Alzheimer's.
Mrs. Adkins read about Dr. Kevorkian in a magazine in October 1989 and
spoke to him at that time.... At the request of her family and with Dr. Kervorkian's encouragement, she sought experimental treatment for Alzheimer's disease in Seattle from December 1989 through March 1990. It failed to help her.
It was then that Mrs. Adkins began to work with Dr. Kervorkian. He obtained
two medical opinions and her medical records from two physicians who had seen
her and had confirmed her condition. He informed her that she needed to be
rational at the time of the assisted suicide. The decision she made was well
thought out. She was, each time I had contact with her, through numerous telephone conversations, consistent and competent regarding the plans she was making. I saw her two final times with two of her sons and her husband ...

and I

could only respect what she, a competent woman, had decided with the incredibly courageous support of her whole family. Like her minister, I stood by her and
those close to her. There was never any doubt in her mind. She was a strongwilled person. Having Alzheimer's disease, she wanted to die before her mind
escaped her and made her, in her eyes, a nonperson. She wanted death with
dignity, and she found it. By giving her the choice she wanted, Dr. Kervorkian
permitted her in turn to enjoy life fully while she still could. That she died in a
van in a parking lot was of no importance to her. It was the choice that
counted.35

32. Id. at 119.
33. Id.
34. Id.

35. Myriam Coppens Letter, 324 NEw ENG. J.MED. 1434, 1435 (May 16, 1991). In the
letter, Ms. Coppens discloses that in March, 1989, she took a position as coordinator of the Hemlock Society in Oregon. She first met Janet Adkins in July, 1989, through that organization. The
Hemlock Society is a prominent advocacy organization for euthanasia.
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The two accounts are not entirely irreconcilable. Judge Gilbert
criticized Dr. Kervorkian for failing to act as a physician, and she correctly concluded that he did not perform all the usual functions of a
physician. It seems safe to say that if you haven't made the decision to
die, you shouldn't see Dr. Kervorkian. What Kervorkian really did was
to invent a suicide device and make it available to those he deemed
qualified to decide to use it. This sort of entrepreneurship is in the tradition of the free market. But the profession of medicine and the mores
and morals of the marketplace do not mesh well. An unregulated free
market in suicide machines is obviously poor public policy.
But the machine, like barbiturates, is in some important way not
the real problem. Looking at the incident from Janet Adkins' perspective, as the Coppens account does, the problem becomes: When can
people decide to take their lives because of severe illness, and what sort
of assistance can others provide them? If it is permissible to assist Ms.
Adkins to die, a machine that works to provide a quick and painless
death at the behest of the user is not a bad thing.
When Janet Adkins sought out Dr. Kervorkian for assistance in
committing suicide, she sought a release from the future course of her
Alzheimer's disease. Was this a rational, permissible thing to do? A
reader replied to a New York Times editorial which criticized Dr.
Kevorkian:
Alzheimer's is an incurable, relentless destruction of the functioning mind. ....
[Flor the victim, these [so-called "good" years] are the nightmare years, the
time when each loss of competence is noted and the next one dreaded. Frustration, fear and anger chase one another in the continuous downward spiral.
By the time intelligent conversation has given way to singsong gibberish and
limbs have forgotten their function, the opportunity to opt out is long since past.
It is only at the onset of the disease that the victim still retains some control over

her fate.
• . . [S]ome may wish to exit before their competence is gone and their
image in the memories of others is diminished ....
I would
consider it a blessing
36
if Dr. Kervorkian is around if and when I need him.

Marcia Angell, executive editor of the New England Journal of
Medicine, considers both the Alzheimer's victim and her family:
People like Janet Adkins, newly diagnosed with Alzheimer's disease, can expect
their brains to be destroyed slowly over many years. Early on, they may be frustrated by their confusion and loss of memory. Eventually, however, the frustration is gone, as is every other indication of higher brain function. At the time of
36.

Renata M. Schwebel Letter, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 23, 1990.
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diagnosis, if not later, they realize that the entire burden of the disease will at
some point be carried on by their families.
Most of us know someone who took on the back-breaking and soul-destroying job of caring at home for a spouse or parent with Alzheimer's disease. This
means round-the-clock attendance, including diapering, feeding and bathing.
When the patient is put in an institution (where the care is often indifferent at
best), the family must "spend down" to qualify for Medicaid.7'

From these perspectives, Janet Adkins' case can be viewed another
way. The choice of death with dignity that she desired was available to
her only through the aid of a maverick physician offering his personal
suicide invention. What she found was a death with less than complete
dignity-in the back of a van, in a parking lot far from home-but a
death nevertheless that was better to her than the life and "natural"
death that awaited her. She maintained control over her life's end,
avoided the dreaded mental, social and familial effects of Alzheimer's,
and achieved a closure to her life that met with her needs for meaning
and self-respect. She had informed herself about her condition, discussed her options with her family, met with a therapist, and consulted
a minister. There seems to be little evidence for Judge Gilbert's uncertain opinion that she was not competent to make the decision she made.
If her death had taken place in more dignified surroundings, her competence might never have come into question. It appears to have been a
decision consistent with her character and values, and one which rational people in her circumstances might make.
KEY QUESTIONS IN THE EUTHANASIA DEBATE

Individual cases alone, of course, cannot resolve broad policy issues. The deaths of Debbie, Diane and Janet Adkins, however, provide
help in thinking about the public policy questions that surround the
lifting of the prohibition against euthanasia. I turn now to the key
questions in the current debate that need to be addressed directly.
1. Is actively bringing on death immoral?
In our prevalent religions, in our public morality, and in our law,
there is a strong moral injunction against taking a life. Justification for
active euthanasia must overcome this basic injunction.
A consensus has emerged on the "passive" means of facilitating
death. "Letting die" by withholding or withdrawing a respirator, sur37.

Marcia Angell, Don't Criticize Doctor Death, N.Y. TIMEs, June 14, 1990, at A27.
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gery and other treatments is now legally and medically acceptable.38
These treatments may be foregone in extreme circumstances when
their effect is to prolong life that is too burdensome to bear. The cause
of death, it is said, is not the withdrawal of life support, but the underlying disease that made such support necessary.3 9
This reasoning has been applied to the withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration. In one case, the Supreme Court of Illinois decided that if nutrition and hydration were discontinued for a man in a
persistent vegetative state, the cause of death would not be starvation
but the underlying disease. This was so, the court held, even if the man
could have remained alive but unconscious for years if given the nutritional support.4
Another accepted means of bringing on death is through the
"double effect" phenomenon. Doctors cause death by administering
painkilling drugs which can and do suppress respiration. Because pain
relief is the motive and death is not intended, even though death may
reasonably be
expected, this form of death-inducing behavior is deemed
42
permissible.
We have decided in these instances of "letting die" that existence
in certain circumstances is unendurable, that death is preferred to life,
and thus we will stop preventing death. But with the "double effect,"
we actually bring on death, with more or less certainty depending on
the dosages and condition of the patient. If dosages of narcotic drugs
are sufficiently high and the patient's respiration is poor, death is a
virtual certainty. Similarly, with the withdrawal of feeding and hydration, we guarantee that death will come,
eliminating the uncertainty
43
that attends some "let die" methods.
Thus it is not so evident that there is much of a moral difference
between removing a feeding tube, providing a dose of narcotics for pain
knowing it is likely to be fatal, and ending life by so-called "active"
38. See cases collected in SociETY FOR THE RIGHT TO DIE, RIGHT-TO-DIE COURT DECISIONS, Vols. I, II, and III; A.M.A. Council on Ethics & Judicial Affairs, Opinion 2.18 (1986)
quoted in In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 295-96 (Ill. 1989).
39. In re Greenspan, 558 N.E.2d 1194 (I11.1990).

40.

Id.

41. Diane E. Meier & Christine K. Cassel, Euthanasiain Old Age: Case Study andEthical
Analysis, 31 J. AM. GERIATRICS Soc. 294, 296 (1983).

42. See id.; see also Lundberg, supra note 18.
43. Karen Ann Quinlan unexpectedly survived for a decade after the disconnection of her
respirator. Michael Norman, Our Towns: The Quinlans and the Latest Right to Die Ruling, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 24, 1985 at B4.
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means. All of these actions in fact bring on death. They are done knowing death to be the outcome. These actions are taken with the view that
death is not only inevitable but, under the circumstances, desirable.
It is sometimes claimed that the "passive" techniques are morally
acceptable because they allow for a natural death, while "active" techniques independently cause death. But in the modern medical setting,
these terms and distinctions are ephemeral. The concept of natural
death in the hospital has lost its meaning. "If you want to have a natural death," says Dr. Alan Stone, "you have to stay out of the doctor's
hands. ' 44 If you make it alive to the hospital, medical technology derails nature and alters the course, experience and timing of death.
Medical techniques extend the process of dying to unprecedented
and unnatural limits. People can live for decades with most of their
brains destroyed, with bodily systems near total breakdown, in states of
irreversible unconsciousness.4 5 Given its power to manipulate and prolong death, modern medicine cannot avoid responsibility for the fates of
patients after physicians treat them, keep them alive, find no cure and
then give up hope. A decision for nonintervention at this point does not
restore the status quo ante. As Kenneth Vaux has written:
Logically and emotionally, we cannot intervene at one phase and then be inactive
at another, more painful phase. We cannot modify nature and then plead that
nature must be allowed to run its unhindered course.4

Even if we view nonintervention as deferring to nature, the question of moral responsibility is not resolved. Nonintervention presents its
own moral problems. For if we decide to stand by and allow nature to
run its course, there is no guarantee that its course will run smoothly or
well. Some "natural" deaths are peaceful and quiet; others are quite
awful. By withdrawing and "letting die," we are leaving people to a
kind of peaceful death lottery, where winners are carried off easily and
44. Alan Stone, The 1987 Jonas Robitscher Memorial Lecture in Law and Psychiatry, The
Right to Die: New Problems For Law and Medicine and Psychiatry, 37 EMORY L.J. 627, 636
(1988).
45. Considering this point, Justice Antonin Scalia once remarked upon "the constantly increasing power of science to keep the human body alive for longer than any reasonable person
would want to inhabit it." Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990)
concurring).
(Scalia, J.,
46. Kenneth Vaux, Debbie's Dying: Mercy Killing and the Good Death, 259 JAMA 2140,
2141 (1988); see also Albert W. Alschuler, Reflection, in AcTivE EUTHANASIA. RELIGION, AND
THE PUBLIC DEBATE 105, 109 (Ron Hamel, ed., The Park Ridge Center, 1991) ("After blessing
us with reason and the power to choose, God may have given us responsibility for other awesome
decisions as well-choices that we would rather leave to God but cannot.").
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quickly and losers linger and suffer long, drawn out deaths-by-degrees.
Stopping medical intervention-leaving things to nature-brings catastrophes as well as relief. It is precisely this perilous game of chance
with nature that we try to avoid with our science and technology. For
many, perhaps most of us, a peaceful death, with some measure of dignity and control, is a desired goal. Its achievement can sometimes be
best assured through active assistance rather than leaving all to chance.
We strive to affect our fate when we live; why give up when we contemplate death?
2.

Will legalized euthanasia have untoward consequences that society ought to avoid by means of a blanket prohibition?

A common refrain in arguments against euthanasia is fear of the
"slippery slope." Opponents of legalization sometimes argue that even
if euthanasia is justified in certain circumstances, its legal acceptance
will lead to unjustified applications. For example, will we eventually be
tempted to eliminate people-the elderly, the unproductive, the mentally disabled-who are deemed burdensome or undesirable by society
at large? This type of argument often invokes the specter of Nazi Germany and its murderous pursuit of population groups deemed socially
unfit.47 The claim is that a public policy of murder inexorably follows
from an initial, limited step, namely the adoption of a carefully defined
euthanasia policy.
The Nazi experience, however, does not support a slippery slope
argument. "Euthanasia" when used by the Nazis was a term that
masked a carefully organized and politically approved plan to condemn
the handicapped, the mentally ill, and designated others to death. The
use of the term euthanasia by the Nazis was a misnomer, as this
description of the program makes clear:
National Socialist euthanasia or "mercy death" was a program of killing persons
with unworthy lives. These persons were not moribund, and their families, with
the rarest exceptions, wanted them to live. It was not a "good death," as the
word denotes, but a systematic program of killing without any mercy whatsoever.
The program was conceived before the Second World War, but high officials
deemed it best to start after the outbreak of war, assuming the public would
accept it more readily as a measure to conserve scarce resources rather than to
waste them on "unworthy" chronically sick, unproductive, and undesirable persons.... The program referred to in the National Socialist bureaucracy as T4
was not based on any law, but was initiated by a secret order, traceable to Hitler
47. E.g., Charles L. Sprung, Changing Attitudes and Practices in Foregoing Life-Sustaining Treatments, 263 JAMA 2211, 2214-15 (1990).
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The T4 program ... was well organand his chief physician, Karl Brandt ....
ized. Mental hospitals were required to report all chronic schizophrenics, manicdepressives, mental defectives, epileptics, and, later, debilitated old persons. A
separate division, the "Public Service Transport Division for the Sick," took care
of the collection and transport of such patients to institutions where they were
Relatives received false death certificates and even letters of
put to death ....
condolence. . . . It is estimated that 4[after two years of this program] ninety

thousand persons went to their deaths.

Robert Jay Lifton, in his book The Nazi Doctors: Medical Killing
and the Psychology of Genocide, demonstrates that the so-called euthanasia program bore no resemblance to mercy killing. Death orders were
issued without consent, without compassion, with murderous intent,
and in furtherance of a specific political agenda. 4 9 The medical personnel who condemned patients to death worked only from questionnaires
filled out by officials at various medical institutions around the country.
Based upon the barest information about diagnosis, ability to work, and
ethnic or religious identification, and without medical histories or personal knowledge of the cases, the Reich's specially chosen physicians
determined who should be killed. Representatives close to Hitler monitored the program, and Hitler himself expressed "intense interest" in
it.50 The infamous SS directly participated in its implementation. In
Lifton's words;
SS personnel manned the buses [transporting the victims], frequently wearing
white uniforms or white coats in order to appear to be doctors, nurses, or medical
attendants. There were reports of "men with white coats and SS boots," the
combination that epitomized much of the "euthanasia" project in general.51

In his study, Lifton consistently puts the word euthanasia in quotation
marks to emphasize that this was a program not of euthanasia, but of
mass murder.
Lifton observes that although doctors administered the effort, its
driving force was the extremist ideology of Nazism. 2 The Nazi "biomedical vision" insisted on Aryan superiority, demanded racial "purification," espoused virulent anti-semitism, and rejected individual
rights in favor of the Nazi-defined collective social and racial health of
48.

Fredrick C. Redlich, Medical Ethics Under National Socialism, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA
1016-1017 (Walter Reich, ed., 1978).

OF

BIOETHICS

49.

ROBERT JAY LIFTON, THE NAZI DOCTORS: MEDICAL KILLING AND THE PSYCHOLOGY

OF GENOCIDE (1986).

50. Id. at 50, 63-79.
51.

Id. at 70.

52. Id. at 22-44.
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the people. Universities, the legal system, and the medical profession
reinforced this vision with research institutes, special courts, and medical societies that promoted notions like "racial hygiene," eugenic sterilization, and the elimination of "life unworthy of life.""3
If there is a slippery slope argument to be made out of the Nazi
experience, it cannot be based upon a progression from euthanasia to
murder. In fact, what preceded the Nazi killing program was not euthanasia but compulsory sterilization.5 ' Animated by the same Nazi
racial ideology, the sterilization program called upon the medical profession to administer an effort to limit reproduction by disfavored
groups.
Yet even the claim that state-sponsored involuntary sterilization
inexorably leads to medical murder is unavailing. The United States
experienced its own eugenics movement early in the twentieth century.55 State laws authorizing involuntary sterilization of those deemed
mentally deficient received constitutional approval in the United States
Supreme Court. Mr. Justice Holmes provided a ringing endorsement of
the practice in Buck v. Bell,56 declaring that: "It is better for all the
world, if ... society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from
continuing their kind. . . . Three generations of imbeciles are
enough." 57 Nevertheless, enthusiasm in the U.S. for involuntary sterilization did not last.5 8 Instead of leading down a slippery slope to even
worse practices, forced eugenic sterilization itself faded away.
A distinguished presidential commission studying ethical problems
in medicine pointed out a central problem of slippery slope arguments:
For such an argument to be persuasive ...

much more is needed than merely

pointing out that allowing one kind of action (itself justified) could conceivably
increase the tendency to allow another action (unjustified). Rather, it must be
shown that pressures to allow the unjustified action will become so strong once
the initial step is taken that the further steps are likely to occur. Since such
evidence is commonly quite limited, slippery slope arguments are themselves subject to abuse in social and legal policy debate. 5'
53. Id. at 16, 17, 21.
54. Id. at 22-44.
55. Id. at 24.

56. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
57. Id. at 207.
58. Lifton, supra note 49, at 24; see Matter of Moe, 432 N.E.2d 712 (Mass. 1982) (calling

the history of compulsory eugenic sterilization laws in the U.S. "sordid").
59.

PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BI-

29
(March 1983). For an additional refutation of the Nazi slippery slope (or "wedge") argument, see
OMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT
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The Nazi sterilization program occurred in circumstances that
created pressures for the most extreme excesses. A ruthless totalitarian
leadership, espousing an ideology of racial and ethnic hate, took control
over key societal institutions and deliberately led a significant part of
the medical profession toward a program of medically supervised murder. Ideology and terror enabled the political leadership to exert maximum pressure for its extermination plan. Resistance was dangerous.
Secrecy and deception reduced outside pressures to stop the carnage.
Finally, a network of institutions which had themselves undergone
Nazification reinforced and supported the extermination effort, 0
No parallel to all this exists in the United States. History is not a
linear progression of inevitable steps, but a complex texture of political,
social, economic, institutional and cultural forces and events. Upon
close examination, it must be concluded that the gruesome Nazi experience does not support the contention that legal euthanasia in this country poses a danger of degeneration into unrestricted killing.
3.

Will euthanasiaadversely affect the doctor-patientrelationship,
or the level of public trust in physicians and the health care
system?

Some writers contend that legalization will reduce the public's
trust in doctors and in the health care system. Michael Levy warns of
the erosion of "trust that the health care delivery system will do everything possible to relieve suffering prior to terminating life." 1 Dr. Alan
Stone claims that
[i]t is destructive to the public good to make people worry that when they go to a
hospital the doctor is thinking about whether to allow them to live or die. When I
go to the emergency room I want to know that the doctor is going to do everything to keep me alive. I do not want to go to somebody who has had a course on
ethics and is thinking that maybe I would prefer to die. 2

These speculations fail on several counts. The erosion of trust in
medical professionals and their institutions is already well underway.
Reasons for this include doctors' poor communications skills, unwillingness to spend time with individual patients, and overreliance on techGlanville Williams, "Mercy-Killing" Legislation-A Rejoinder,43 MINN. L. REV. 1,9-11 (1959).
60. LiFrON, supra note 49, at 22-79.
61. Should Physicians Perform Euthanasia?,Am. MED. NEWS 12, 15 (Jan. 7, 1991) (response of Michael H. Levy).
62. Stone, supra note 44, at 642.
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nology.6 3 Hospitals and nursing homes are notorious
for their exorbi4
tant charges and inattention to patients' needs.
It is possible that permitting euthanasia will have no effect on the
existing level of trust-that the other factors at work influencing and
corroding the doctor-patient relationship are more important than any
change in the legal rules on what is allowed and not allowed. If the
editor of JAMA is correct that mainstream physicians will not practice
euthanasia, 5 there may be no perceptible effects on the everyday practice of medicine. Doctors who display the traditional virtues-warmth,
compassion, skill and attentiveness-will win their patients' trust. Doctors who are too busy, too machine oriented, or too emotionally frozen,
will not.
Refusal to give aid in dying, however, may actually add to the
level of distrust. The public seems to fear the dying process now because it believes doctors' efforts will prolong, not relieve, suffering. Physicians Christine Cassel and Diane Meier offer this analysis of the popular view of current medical practice:
The public appears to be losing faith in doctors, at least partly because of our

paternalistic and sometimes cruel insistence on life at any cost.
The medical profession in the United States has reflected our society's unwillingness to accept death as part of life and to face it with some humility.
Perhaps the public is now ahead of the medical profession in this regard, as
patients increasingly seek the assistance of physicians in their time of need, when
dying with dignity becomes more important than prolonging life. The rigid view
that physicians should never assist in suicide denies the complexity of the personal meanings life can have in favor of a single-minded devotion to its maximal
duration .... The refusal of physicians to deal with their patients at the level of
the personal meaning of life and death is a reflection of how sterile and technological our profession has become."

The alternative of euthanasia may well make things better between doctors and patients. Euthanasia requests might foster a deeper
dimension to some doctor-patient relationships. Making euthanasia legal moves it into the arena for open discussion and consideration. Since
63. See JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1984).
64. See NORMAN COUSINS. THE HEALING HEART: ANTIDOTES TO PANIC AND HELPLESSNESS
(1983) (author avoids hospitalization as hindrance to health); for a chilling story of nursing home
care and expense, see Conolly, infra note 104, at 505-506.
65. Physicians would have a choice under current euthanasia legalization proposals, which
make participation optional, not mandatory.
66. Diane E. Meier & Christine K. Cassel, Morals and Moralism in the Debate Over Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide, 323 NEw ENG. J. MED. 750, 751 (1990).
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no law is likely to force an unwilling doctor to practice euthanasia, a
process of conversation, explanation and negotiation may ensue between doctors and patients requesting help in ending life. As Professor
Anne Davis has said: "Dying is one of life's most profound experiences.
To share this

. . .

with another who is willing to understand and ac-

knowledge this type of suffering, and to act on it, surely
must create
67
possible."
be
can
that
bonds
trusted
most
the
of
one
In any event, it is clear that trust cannot survive in the present
context surrounding dying. How can the public place much faith in a
process that involves, in the words of Dr. Robert Wood, "long, drawn
out months to years of increasingly complicated illness that can require
an array of specialists, confusing choices, false hopes, loss of control
and dignity, misery and pain"? 6 Add to this enormous costs and the
propensity of certain doctors to block out others' suffering, to avoid
contact with the dying, and to neglect available measures for pain relief, and the picture of an ailing doctor-patient relationship becomes
complete.
Dr. Stone's concern that emergency room doctors will assume he
wants to die is unfounded. A physician who knows nothing of the patient and treats an emergency is always expected to do all he can to
address the immediate crisis. No euthanasia proposal would change
this.
4. Will euthanasia be freely chosen or subtly coerced?
Some predict that euthanasia, if available, might be chosen under
subtle pressure. This pressure might come from families or doctors
wanting to induce someone to request euthanasia, or it might be an
internal reaction on the part of the patient to a cold and uncaring environment. As Professor Stephen Sapp puts it,
[O]ur society's current treatment of older people destroys the self worth of many.
...Thus the truly voluntary nature of active euthanasia among the elderly seems
hard to guarantee. The possibility of ending their lives sooner, with moral and
legal sanction, may well lead to a form of subtle coercion, with the implication
that the responsible course to pursue is to utilize this option. 69
67. Should Physicians Perform Euthanasia?,supra note 61, at 15 (response of Anne I.

Davis).
68. Id. at 12.
69. Stephen Sapp, Reflection, in AcrivE EUTHANASIA.
88, 90 (Ron Hamel, ed., The Park Ridge Center, 1991).
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Another commentator suggests that the dying will "come to feel that it
is not just their right, it is their duty to linger no longer, to just hurry
70
up and get out of the way."
This prediction may fall by reality's wayside, because it underestimates people's desire to live and overstates their susceptibility to suggestion that they just kill themselves. Moreover, our present experience
offers no evidence to suggest that family members subtly coerce decisions for withdrawal of respirators and other life supports, or that doctors do so casually or meanly or in a way contrary to ethics or good
medical practice.
There is another problem with the subtle coercion argument. To
say that severely ill people soberly considering their overall life circumstances, which often does include societal indifference to their plight,
are "coerced" is stretching the meaning of coercion. In truth, all decisions are made against a backdrop of societal regard or the lack of it,
and we must not sacrifice others' decision making power because collectively we treat them worse than we should.
If there is true coercion exerted on an individual by family members or doctors, of course it would destroy the voluntariness of the euthanasia decision. Certainly, coercion that leads to unwanted euthanasia could be criminally punished and presumably deterred.
5. If euthanasia is legalized, what social messages will be
communicated?
A sociological objection often comes into discussion of euthanasia,
to the effect that legalization will send out bad messages to society, for
example, that we don't care about the dying or that we are not upholding the value of the sanctity of life. I am skeptical about this on several
grounds.
Interpreting the "messages" communicated by any social practice
is a speculative undertaking too easily influenced by one's moral or political position on the practice. Who is to say what message emanates
from the acceptance of euthanasia? Some might say it is a message of
disrespect for life. Others may say it is a message of respect for autonomy, choice and freedom from the fear of a cruel and tormenting end.
Even more important, the argument tends to turn people into symbols serving a cause bearing a "good message" for us all. The cause
70. Should Physicians Perform Euthanasia?, supra note 61, at 14 (response of Eric M.
Chevien).
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may in fact be deserving, or it may represent a moral crusade to impose certain ideologies on others. Either way, turning people in need
into symbolic messengers7 1 and sacrificing their personal welfare for
the sake of sending a better message is a troubling and in this instance
unwarranted thing to do.
It is grossly unfair to make the sick and dying bear the burden of
preserving society's devotion to the sanctity of life. If society is failing
in that regard-and its wanton violence, inadequate provision of basic
nutrition and health care, high rates of child abuse and infant mortality, and childhood poverty of millions indicate that it is-making the
desperately ill endure cruel suffering is not the answer.
Some writers worry about the effects of euthanasia legalization on
the community. Daniel Callahan writes that it would "create the wrong
kind of relationship between people, the creation of a community that
sanctions private killings between its members. 72 This, he asserts,
would be a "momentous . . . social change, one that would be fundamental and far-reaching in its implications for human relationships. " 7
It is hard to rely on such a dire prediction. It assumes too much:
that a whole community will be dramatically and adversely affected by
a change in a single medical practice. This argument implicitly diminishes the importance of all other social forces in our culture that affect
human relationships. The killings that do affect our societal relations
and quality of life, I suggest, are not the occasional ones motivated by
mercy and compassion. They are the ones perpetrated every day by a
large class of people with virtually no ties to the social and moral community that should encompass us all. In truth, the legal status of euthanasia will probably have no effect on the very troubled state of human
relations we experience today.
6.

Will euthanasiahave a negative impact on doctors? Is it outside
the medical role?

Not all doctors regard euthanasia as inherently outside the medical role.7 4 Even if a majority do, this does not preclude a change in the
71.
72.

See In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434 (N.J. 1987),
DANIEL CALLAHAN, WHAT KIND OF LIFE: THE LIMITS OF MEDICAL PROGRESS 231

(1990).
73. Id.
74. The State, L.A. TIMES, May 8, 1988, at Pt. 1, 2 (poll of San Francisco physicians indicating that most support voluntary euthanasia for the terminally ill); Thomas Lace, The Physician
Can Play a Positive Role in Euthanasia,262 JAMA 3075 (Dec. 1, 1989).
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role definition. The medical profession, though initially conservative
and resistant to change, has made adjustments in its thinking in the
past.
Not so many years ago, doctors opposed passive techniques of "letting die." In the landmark case of In re Quinlan,7 5 Karen Quinlan's
doctors fought her father in court to keep her respirator attached, despite the fact that she was permanently unconscious. The New Jersey
Supreme Court permitted withdrawal of the respirator, galvanizing the
national right to die movement. Citizens and courts pushed the medical
profession throughout the country to change its attitude. 7 Now withholding and withdrawing treatment is deemed medically ethical7 7 and
is widely practiced.
So are other forms of euthanasia, although doctors avoid the label.
The administration of narcotics to kill pain, in dosages that sometimes
suppress breathing and kill the patient, is also an accepted practice. 8
The withdrawal of nutrition and hydration has garnered increasing
support, most memorably in the case of Nancy Cruzan, a young woman in a state of irreversible, permanent unconsciousness.
Ms. Cruzan's doctor at first opposed withdrawal of tube feeding.
In court, her parents sought an order permitting cessation of artificial
feeding and hydration. The state of Missouri asserted its right to require a showing of clear and convincing evidence that Ms. Cruzan
would have desired withdrawal of these treatments. After the United
States Supreme Court upheld Missouri's position,7 9 a new hearing was
held in the Missouri courts and her doctor agreed that withdrawal was
the right thing to do. 8° The Missouri court permitted withdrawal and
Ms. Cruzan died soon thereafter.
Courts in several other states have ruled this form of euthanasia
acceptable, despite the unique feature of such withdrawals: they cause
death, regardless of the underlying condition.8 1 When we withdraw a
75. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429
U.S. 922 (1976).
76. See Sprung, supra note 47.
77. See id. at 18.
78. See Meier & Cassel, supra note 41.
79. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
80. See Andrew H. Malcolm, Judge Allows Feeding-Tube Removal, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 15,
1990, at 10 ("Asked by Miss Cruzan's court-appointed guardian, if it was in her best interests to
continue like this, the doctor, who had originally opposed stopping her nutrition, paused. 'No, sir,'
he said. 'I think it would be personally a living hell.' ").
81. See, e.g., In re Greenspan, 558 N.E.2d 1194, 1207 (Ill. 1990) (Ward, J., dissenting).
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respirator, there is some chance the individual will breathe on his own;
when we withdraw nutrition, there is no chance of self-feeding. The
line between "letting die" and terminating life has already been
blurred, without noticeable effects on the moral character and role definitions of doctors.
Euthanasia proposals like that considered in Washington State
would allow but not require doctors to participate in actively aiding
desperately ill persons to die. Doctors who reject euthanasia would
therefore not need to revise their own professional and personal role
definitions.
Will approval of euthanasia by physicians render doctors insensitive to the dying or disorient them in their primary role as healers? In
the present health care system, doctor behavior toward the dying is already insensitive. A common problem aired in the literature centers on
doctor neglect and abandonment of dying patients.8 2 Perhaps the present system fosters this by allowing an inordinate amount of suffering
to continue for months, leading many caregivers to simply block it out.
By avoiding the hopeless patient and the family, the doctor learns to
live with the brutality of prolonged suffering by disregarding it.
What medicine seems to lack today is a mature acknowledgement
of human finitude, failed efforts, and the limits of human endurance.
No one wants doctors who give up too soon, but the greater fear today
is of overly enthusiastic physicians. Euthanasia requests will disorient
such headstrong doctors, but -they need to be disoriented, and reoriented toward the realities of life and their profession. Doctors who
appreciate the difficulties of living with extreme burdens, whether physical or psychic, already understand the need to subordinate the healing
role. When healing becomes impossible, other things begin to matter
more than continued existence. These doctors won't be disoriented by
the legalization of euthanasia; they need only to consider expanding the
range of conduct that best serves their incurable patients' interests.
7.

What of the possibility of mistake and abuse?

Many writers raise questions about the possibilities of mistaken
diagnosis and prognosis which may lead to misguided choices for early
death. In addition to mistake, there is the possibility of abuse by some
82. See Stephen A. Newman, Treatment Refusals For the Critically and Terminally Ill:
Proposed Rules For the Family, the Physician, and the State, 3 N.Y.L. ScH. J. HuM. Ris. 35, 64,

71 (1985).
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practitioners, whose lack of skill, whose callousness, or whose deliberate
wrongful conduct may result in unwarranted terminations of life.
These are serious concerns. A public policy decision to legalize
currently unauthorized versions of aid in dying must consider the effects of scale. It is possible to have euthanasia occur on a small scale,
quietly, with the participation of doctors who are sensitive to the sufferings of their patients and willing to exceed formal boundaries to do
what they believe is right in the particular circumstances. Dr. Quill
provides perhaps the most prominent example of a doctor who knew his
patient well, discussed options with her, did all he could to alleviate her
suffering, and helped her even when she finally chose to end her life.
Although things often work acceptably on a small scale they may
not work out so well on a large scale. When not just the Dr. Quills, but
the entire medical profession is potentially involved, including its worst
elements-the poorly trained, the barely competent, the insensitive, the
arrogant, the lazy, the tired, the harried, and the lesser skilled at
medicine and human relations-there is the danger that practitioners
will fail to do what they can to avoid euthanasia where euthanasia is
inappropriate.
While this properly causes concern, legalization may not work so
as to produce more mistakes or abuse than nonlegalization. First, we
may be headed for a time when euthanasia will be practiced more and
more, whether or not the medical profession participates. The interest
in suicide as an option is on the rise, and may be expected to increase
as the baby boom generation enters old age. 83 If the medical profession
ignores the demand-for easy death, people will resort to self-help, which
undoubtedly will carry its own incidence of abuse and mistake.
Second, as the story of "Debbie" shows, euthanasia as practiced
clandestinely today presents its own set of concerns. Making the practice illegal discourages discussion. One must be very sure of others' reactions before confiding in them. The useful deliberation that comes
from sharing ideas and perspectives is thereby lost. If we restrict euthanasia to the realm of covert action, we thereby run added risks of mis84
take and abuse.
Third, we may not see euthanasia practiced on a truly wide scale
83. See Altman, supra note 6.
84.

See Lundburg, supra note 18 who writes "Such discussions should not be confined to

whispers in doctors' dressing rooms and hallways and such actions covered up easily because the
autopsy has become a vanishingly rare procedure in many hospitals, hospices, and nursing homes
and because hospital death investigations have become increasingly inconsistent."
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following legalization. If the reaction of most physicians is to shun the
practice, we will still have only a limited number of participants and
the scale will remain small. Polls of physicians indicate that even supporters of euthanasia in principle may not personally want to engage in
its practice."5
Fourth, we may again look to the experience concerning permissible versions of euthanasia. We have already undertaken the risk of mistake and abuse in making decisions to withdraw nutrition, artificial respiration, and other life sustaining techniques, and by administering
potentially lethal doses of painkilling drugs. We do not hear of abuse of
the power to exercise these death-inducing actions; one would expect
evidence of abuse to have surfaced by now.
Fifth, the risk of abuse may not be so great, because of the deterrent effect of homicide laws. If killing is lawful if done according to an
established euthanasia procedure, but criminal if it is not, ordinary doctors are likely to pay close attention to proper procedure and not treat
the matter casually. In fact, the threat of criminal prosecution may be
so strong that it discourages not merely potential abusers but also prudent physicians, who may refuse to perform the permitted procedure.
Finally, the existence of risk need not preclude legalization. In
making policy, risks of all sorts are weighed; some are deemed worth
taking. Consider social policies that favor auto travel, gun possession,
and building bridges and skyscrapers. Consider those that tolerate
safety hazards in the workplace and environmental hazards of known
and unknown dimension. In many such policy areas, we accept even
deaths of healthy people as a consequence of policy choices. Many of
these accepted deaths are accidental, like the 50,000 deaths annually
occurring on our highways. They are predictable statistically, however,
and the choices we make are as lethal to the victims as intentional
deaths.86 In medical practice, there is no absolute certainty. We must
and do permit people to take risks, even with their lives. Given the
power of modern medicine to postpone death without enhancing life, a
policy permitting people to avoid a prolonged and dreadful dying experience is worth some risk.
85. The State, supra note 74.
86. Leon E. Trachtman, Why Tolerate the Statistical Victim?, 15 HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
Feb. 1985, at 14.
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8. What interests of the individual does euthanasiaserve?
a. Philosophicaland spiritual self-assertion
For the severely, irreversibly ill, a rational choice for euthanasia
promotes control over the end of life. At stake, observes Sheldon Kurtz,
is a "matter of vital, exclusive importance: the timing, manner and circumstance of one's death."87 The choice has practical, philosophical
and spiritual ingredients.
Opponents of euthanasia often emphasize the spiritual nature of
their views, rooting their opposition in the idea that life is a gift of God.
The cliche about "playing God" when making life and death decisions
is meant to restrain decisions favoring death. But it is wrong to leave
the spiritual ground to euthanasia opponents. Decisions about death are
inherently philosophical and, for believers in God, religious. Believers
who contemplate euthanasia must necessarily resolve for themselves
spiritual questions as to life's meaning and the proper realms of God
and man.
In so doing, Americans do not always follow their religious leaders. Almost all religions reject "active" euthanasia, although they often
accept the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment in hopeless cases.88
Yet many Americans who support euthanasia come from religious
backgrounds. A 1991 Roper poll conducted in the states of California,
Oregon and Washington 9 showed strong support for aid in dying
among both Protestants and Catholics." This included approval of doctor-provided lethal drug prescriptions to terminally ill people who request them, and the use of powers of attorney to enable family members or friends to make decisions about administration of lethal drugs
for individuals who have lost mental capacity.""
In 1987, pollster Louis Harris reached this conclusion about the
views of religious Americans: "There is no major segment of the public
that does not support euthanasia by wide margins. This includes
87.

Should Physicians Perform Euthanasia?,supra note 61, at 13 (response of Sheldon F.

Kurtz).
88.

See Ron Hamel & Donald DuBose, Views of the Major Faith Traditions,in ACTIVE

49, 49-78 (Ron Hamel, ed., The Park Ridge
1991).
These states have been the stages for political efforts to legalize euthanasia.
1991 Roper Poll, supra note 12.
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Catholics and members of the Moral Majority whose evangelical
preacher leaders vigorously oppose legalizing euthanasia. "92
One's appreciation of life may lead to an acceptance of its end in
circumstances that promote ideals of love, kindness and human connection. Dr. Timothy Quill, in his account of his patient Diane, noted that
once she had a supply of drugs available to end her life, she was relieved of the fear of a painful and dependent death. She was then able
to make "deep, personal connections with her family and close
friends." 93 The last months of life
were very intense and important for Diane. Her son stayed home from college,
and they were able to be with one another and say much that had not been said
earlier. Her husband did his work at home so that he and Diane could spend
more time together. She spent time with her closest friends. I had her come into
the hospital for a conference with our residents, at which she illustrated in a
most profound and personal way the importance of informed decision making,
the right to refuse treatment, and the extraordinarily personal effects of illness
and interaction with the medical system."

Diane's manner of living and control over dying profoundly affected Quill himself. He wrote:
Diane taught me about the range of help I can provide if I know people well and
if I allow them to say what they really want. She taught me about life, death,
and honesty and about taking charge and facing tragedy squarely when it strikes.
She taught me that I can take small risks for people that I really know and care
about.95

Quill eventually turned that small risk of detection of his own role into
a much larger risk by publicly describing his deliberate stretching of
legal and professional rules.
If our lives are to have a transcendent meaning, as religious traditions would insist, one's transcendence is perhaps most truly realized in
the capacity to inspire profoundly the lives of others. Diane, through
the events that preceded and included her self-chosen time and means
of death, did just that.
Avoidance of suffering by patients and families

b.

Disease and its treatment rob the individual of a great deal. Some
92.
93.
94.
95.

See HARRIS, supra note 12, at 157.
See Quill, supra note 4, at 693.
Id.
Id. at 694.
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conditions cause a host of extreme physical effects: bones so brittle they
easily break, severely impaired breathing, constant exhaustion, emaciation, paralysis, blindness, recurrent nausea and vomiting, persistent fever and inability to eat or sleep. Physical problems often come in multipies, with increasing bodily degradation and pain. Mental deterioration
adds a different cluster of problems, from loss of memory and ability to
perform everyday tasks to the inability to communicate with or even
recognize others. Treatments for serious diseases often have their own
toxic side effects, intensifying physical and mental suffering.
The magnitude of psychological suffering that accompanies dire
medical conditions is easily underestimated. The varied sources of
psychic pain that grip the victim of catastrophic illness include losses of
privacy, lifestyle and established routines; the destruction of one's sense
of security and sense of normalcy; the painful awareness of one's former physical powers and present incapacities; the dreaded anticipation
of future mental and physical deterioration; the loss of control over
one's life and life plans; the unwanted dependence on machines and
doctors; the loss of home and of social roles in the outside world
brought about by hospitalization; and the loss of hope, of optimism
about the future, and of pleasure in life. For some there is the pain of
knowing that one is destined, in Samuel Gorovitz's words, "to witness
and endure a final stage not as an effective agent, but merely a deteriorating object." 96
Socially, disease can precipitate a kind of social death in which
there is loss of contact with other people. Isolation of the incurably ill,
even in busy hospitals, is common.9 7 The desire for distance from the
dying, doctors' priorities in caring for those with a reasonable chance
for recovery, the monetary reward system, time pressures, and other
personal and institutional factors all contribute to what one physician
has called "a miserable job of caring for the dying" performed by the
medical system.98
Patients and families also suffer the stress of mounting emotional
and financial burdens. The wish to avoid depletion of family resources
may motivate some to seek a quicker rather than slower death. Few
96.
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(1982) quoted in M. Pabst Battin, The Least Worst Death, HASTINGS CENTER REP. 15 (April,
1983).
97. See Newman, supra note 82.
98. Ronald E. Cranford, Reflection in ACTIVE EUTHANASIA, RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC
DEBATE, supra note 69, at 80.
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mothers and fathers would want to leave behind an impoverished family. Many would also not want to feel responsible for ruining the quality of life of a family member who would have to serve as a caretaker
during an arduous, chronic fatal illness.
Finally, people have an interest in how they will be remembered.
The manner of one's death may overshadow other facets of one's life, to
the point of haunting loved ones who witness an intolerable death. Justice Stevens, dissenting in Cruzan, suggested that this interest was of
supreme importance:
Nancy Cruzan's interest in life, no less than that of any other person, includes an
interest in how she will be thought of after her death by those whose opinions
mattered to her. There can be no doubt that her life made her dear to her family, and to others. How she dies will affect how that life is remembered. The trial
court's order authorizing Nancy's parents to cease their daughter's treatment
would have permitted the family that cares for Nancy to bring to a close her
tragedy and her death. Missouri's objection to that order subordinates Nancy's
body, her family, and the lasting significance of her life to the State's own interests. The decision we review thereby interferes with constitutional interests of the
highest order."

c.

Avoiding

ineffective, family-assisted or premature suicide

attempts

Some people interested in suicide as a better end to life than
chronic, incurable, debilitating illness are going to pursue their interest
whether euthanasia is legal or not. Unfortunately, some will attempt

suicide and make things worse for themselves. As George Colt observed
in his work The Enigma of Suicide,
Despite popular belief to the contrary, suicide is not easy-particularly if one is
old, infirm, or terminally ill. Under current laws those without access to lethal
drugs are often driven by desperation to more secretive, violent, and lonely
deaths. One terminally ill cancer patient, immobilized in a Stryker frame and
partially paralyzed, doused his chest with lighter fluid and set himself afire. Even
worse, without knowledge of proper dosages and methods, suicide attempts are
often bungled, leaving the victim worse off than before. Many intended suicides
by gunshot leave the person alive but brain-damaged; drug overdoses that are not
fatal may have the same effect.100

99. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2885-2886 (1990) (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
100. COLT, supra note 8.
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Betty Rollin, author of a book called Last Wish about the suicide
of her mother has written:
Among the saddest [of letters from readers] are from people--or the close relatives of people-who have tried to die, failed and suffered even more. Many of
these people sought help-from physicians or family-but were denied it because
although suicide is legal, assisted suicide is not.101

Some individuals too weak to commit suicide unaided will seek
help from spouses. The burden on such spouses, even those who believe
in the benevolence of the death, will be great. Dr. Diane Meier has
commented: "[F]orcing husbands and wives to take the role of participating in an assisted suicide for their loved one because they can't get
help from their doctor is a terrible and punishing thing to do to a
10 2
family.1
A total ban on assisted deaths might have another unintended,
detrimental effect. Persons with diseases like Alzheimer's are now
tempted to try suicide at an early stage of their disease when they are
still mentally and physically fit. If they knew euthanasia were available
later, perhaps through an advance directive or health care proxy, these
individuals might choose to live longer, through a later stage of the
illness. Commentators made much of the fact that Janet Adkins, although suffering from Alzheimer's, was active and fit at the time she
sought out Dr. Kervorkian's suicide machine.10 3 It is possible she chose
this early death because of the lack of a choice later, when she degenerated into mental incompetency.
9.

Would better efforts at pain control provide a substitute for
euthanasia?

In an article promoting pain control as an alternative to euthanasia, Dr. Matthew Conolly writes: "All too often physicians fail their
patients, either through ignorance of the drugs available, or through
neglect of the other forms of treatment available." 104 He rejects one
common reason for providing inadequate relief from pain, saying that
101. Altman, supra note 6.
102. Whose Side Are You On? (CBS television broadcast, July 19, 1991).
103. See, e.g., Editorial, The Kervorkian Cure:Death, N.Y. TiMEs, Dec. 9, 1990, § 4, at 16;
People v. Kervorkian, Dkt. 90-390963-AZ (Mich. Ct. Cl. Feb. 5, 1991), reprintedin 7 IssuEs IN
L. & MED. 107 (1990).

104.

Michael Conolly, Alternative to Euthanasia: Pain Management, 4 ISSuES

MED. 497, 500 (1989).
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the "fear of drug addiction in terminally ill patients would be laughable if it had not caused so many patients to endure needless pain."10 5
What the terminally ill patient needs, he continues, is a "very active
ongoing and hopefully scientific endeavor on his behalf to control
pain."106 Other physicians have also noted the "sadly deficient" efforts
10 7
at pain relief provided by many doctors.
Dr. Conolly describes effective pain control as depending upon special skills, including in-depth knowledge of a wide range of drugs, detailed understanding of the disparate sources of physical pain, and good
diagnostic assessment. 08 Physicians must also be prepared to spend
time carefully following a sometimes changing diagnostic picture and
monitoring patient reactions to different pain control techniques. If all
this is done, Conolly states, there will be no need for euthanasia, for
"the terminally ill, when properly cared for, simply do not ask for
euthanasia."' 0 9
There can be no argument with the notion that doctors must do
better at relieving controllable pain. A number of leading physicians,
finding that pain management "seems to be an unfamiliar area to many
physicians," have sensibly recommended that "educational material be
distributed to [doctors] . . . from a noncommercial source." 110 Other

proposals include changing medical school and residency training to include care for the dying, and making hospice care an integral part of
the nation's health care system."'
Suggesting that pain management be improved is one thing; positing it as an alternative to legalized euthanasia, however, is quite another. Given the special skill needed and the apparent widespread lack
not only of that skill but of the attitudes that support learning and
using them, how realistic is it to expect that pain relief will be adequately provided in all the cases in which it is needed? Over three decades ago, Professor Yale Kamisar noted similar complaints from lead105.
106.
107.
108.
of bones,
treatment.
109.
110.
111.
7, 1991.
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Id. at 504.
Wanzer, supra note 3, at 847.
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ing professionals about the neglect of pain control. 112 Overcoming this
persistent, intractable problem will require supplanting well entrenched
physician behavior that seems highly resistant to change. Social policy
must be based upon reality, and the reality seems to be that the problem of physical pain for patients will not go away. Pain will be a major
factor for many patients in dire medical circumstances. If pain management reforms someday permeate the medical schools and health
care institutions of this country, that is fine. But it won't happen overnight, it may not happen at all, and hoping for it forms a poor basis for
social policy argument.
Even if pain control were to become the health care system's top
priority, the contention that this will end the need to consider euthanasia is ill-founded. Some people will reject the invitation to choose drugs
that induce mental stupor in order to avoid pain. For the incurably ill,
losing alertness, control and even consciousness 13 may not be acceptable as a way to prolong existence. Further, it is not universally held
that pain control techniques guarantee against all physical pain. Dr.
Quill's description of the course of treatment that his patient Diane
could have chosen involved much toxicity and pain, with death the
most likely outcome. He reveals that "the last four patients with acute
leukemia at our hospital had died very painful deaths in the hospital
during various stages of treatment. 1 1 2 4 Quill himself was a former hospice director, but he could not relieve the reality of pain for many
patients.
Perhaps most important, the pain management alternative to euthanasia considers only one form of pain, physical pain. It ignores the
deeper sources of psychological pain that contribute to suffering.
Anguish is not readily susceptible to drug treatment, even if pain is. As
Anne Davis has said:
There are times when the existential experience of dying becomes an affront to
the patient's meaning of his or her own life. Even when the patient is dying in an
environment of care and compassion, there is a deep suffering, having nothing to
do with physical pain, that cannot be reached or helped by another person. This
sort of suffering does not build character, and wanting it ended is not a sign of
15
cowardice.

112. Kamisar, supra note 7, at 1009.
113. In one article, twelve doctors state that the "proper dose of pain medication is the dose
that is sufficient to relieve pain and suffering, even to the point of unconsciousness" Wanzer, supra
note 3, at 847.
114. Quill, supra note 4, at 692.
115. Should Physicians Perform Euthanasia?,supra note 61, at 15 (response of Anne
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Perhaps the very availability of euthanasia will be a spur to physicians to improve their knowledge of pain control. If euthanasia is not
seen by doctors as a desirable outcome, being prepared to offer an alternative of effective pain control will seem more worthwhile. People
for whom physical pain is the prime factor may indeed withdraw assisted suicide requests if offered the prospect of effective pain relief.
10.

Can improved support services provide an alternative to
euthanasia?

Those opposed to euthanasia sometimes say that if the sick in our
society were given decent supportive care and services to help them
deal with their illnesses and their related needs, there would be no need
to consider euthanasia. 116 Before legalizing euthanasia, shouldn't we
explore this option first?
This past summer the New York Times carried a news story about
therapists ministering to the dying. It portrayed the work of one therapist sensitively working with a man dying of AIDS, helping him to deal
with the many issues he confronts: how and what to say to his elevenyear-old son; how to come to terms with his loss of job and of many of
the ordinary activities of his life; how to choose among treatment options and deal with the cycles of hope and fear that occur; what financial arrangements to make; how to "budget his limited energy" most
productively, and finally, how to get ready "to die in a state of peacefulness. ' 1 7 It is apparent that this therapist cares about his client, and
he is rendering a great and much needed service.
It is also apparent that most Americans will never receive such
help. It is too expensive, putting it out of the reach of most, and government is not likely to pay for it. Social services, whether for the ill,
the abused child, the battered woman, the pregnant addict, the mentally ill, the victim of crime, or the many others who could benefit from
social supports, do not merit high priority in contemporary society. Reallocating limited resources is difficult enough even when it would be
Davis).
116.

See, e.g., Prof. Michael E. Mahler Letter, LA. TIMEs, June 16, 1990, Pt. B, at 6 ("The

participants in active euthanasia are avoiding the difficult problems of making the quality of life
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cost effective to do so." 8 It is beyond imagination to expect the provision of expensive services for the seriously ill to be forthcoming. In this
circumstance, social policy decisions should not be influenced by the
theoretical existence of preferred but costly alternatives. Just as we do
not rely upon medical miracles to defeat the demand for withdrawal of
treatment from the very ill, so we should not rely upon social miracles
in making policy choices about euthanasia.
Even if support were forthcoming, the desire for merciful death
would not necessarily cease. A supported, mentally sound person with
AIDS might well opt for suicide and seek assistance as a way to defeat
the cruelty of the disease. The notion that support services would displace the desire of some to die fails to take account of the rationality of
the choice of death over the multiple cruelties of existence. Those with
supportive families may have even more reason to choose death. An
early death may be less arduous for oneself and for loved ones than an
extended period of illness marked by progressive degradation of the
body and extensive caretaking burdens borne by family members.
While the demand for euthanasia may be lessened by high quality
human support services, these services alone will not substitute for a
sound policy allowing merciful death.11 9
11.

How can we devise standardsfor the proper use of euthanasia?

The search for standards for the employment of euthanasia and
assisted suicide will be difficult. The law can only do so much to define
the appropriate circumstances. Inevitable ambiguities of terminology
and variations from person to person in medical condition, degree of
confidence in diagnosis and prognosis, and degree of suffering complicate the rulemaking task.
In the Netherlands, euthanasia is practiced within an ambiguous
legal framework. Despite the penal code's explicit prohibition against
euthanasia, a series of judicial opinions beginning in 1973 created an
exception for justified euthanasia responsibly carried out. As described
118. The MacNeil/Lehrer Newshour (PBS television broadcast, March 30, 1989).
119. Examples of reported cases in which better support services might have provided an
option to the patients preferable to euthanasia include McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617 (Nev.
1990) and State v. McAfee, 385 S.E.2d 651 (Ga. 1989). After Mr. McAfee won the right to have
his ventilator disconnected, he chose to live instead when adequate social services were made
available. Lawrence Applebome, An Angry Man Fights to Die, Then Tests Life, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb.
7, 1990, at Al (late ed.).
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by M.A.M. de Wachter in 1989, the conditions imposed on the practice
are:
(1) voluntariness: a persistent, conscious and free request by the patient; (2) a
hopeless situation: a state of the disease or illness that both physician and patient
consider to be beyond recovery; and (3) consultation of a colleague: confirmation
of the decision-making process whereby physician and patient agree on the appropriateness of the euthanasia request.120

Despite the open consideration given the issue since 1973, de Wachter
reports that "many serious questions remain. No comprehensive ethical
or legal framework has been constructed. .... -121 Hospitals have developed their own procedures, and physicians who object to the practice
are not required to engage in it.
Restricting the practice to competent patients, as the Dutch do,
has certain advantages. Guidelines can be constructed using traditional
medical and legal notions. The request from the competent patient, for
example, clearly should be voluntary and informed. The Dutch notion
of persistent and consistent request over some reasonable time period
seems a sensible way to ensure that the request is not the transient
product of depression, of impulse, or of a judgment distorted by "pain,
' There are some who argue that we must never
strain or narcotics."122
trust the judgment of those in the grip of catastrophic illness,1 23 but
this wholesale dismissal of sufferers' rationality is too sweeping and
constitutes a gross denial of free will.
Requiring informed consent would certainly mean at the least that
individuals be aware of their medical conditions and prognoses, be advised of any medical uncertainty, and know the nature of pain relief
available. Since the euthanasia request would seek an unusual kind of
cooperation, this might be an opportunity to make the consent process
more meaningful by requiring discussion of the decision, a burden not
ordinarily placed upon patients. Rules might mandate disclosure of the
euthanasia request to family members, to ensure that they are aware of
it and able to take part in discussing the matter with the patient and
120. M.A.M. de Wachter, Active Euthanasiain the Netherlands, 262 JAMA 3316 (1989).
121. Id. at 3319. A recent news article reports on an important study describing how euthanasia is actually working in practice in the Netherlands. Most euthanasia, it states, is performed
by doctors in the patient's home. Marlise Simons, Dutch Survey Casts New Light on Patients
Who Choose to Die, N.Y. TiMas, Sept. 11, 1991, at C12.
122. Kamisar, supra note 7, at 977.
123. Richard M. Glass, AIDS and Suicide, 259 JAMA 1369 (1988); Kamisar, supra note
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physician if they wish. Freeing the physician of the obligation to provide assistance in dying, in addition to showing respect for physicians'
moral sensibilities, might also encourage some patients to discuss the
issue. Through discussion, they may persuade physicians not opposed in
principle to assisted suicide that theirs is a rational and deliberately
considered request.
A requirement of consultation with a second physician, usually directed to confirmation of medical condition and prognosis, might also
contribute to the discussion that seems essential to a proper response to
a request for euthanasia. In some circumstances, discouragement of suicide might be appropriate. As Marzuk and colleagues observe, "Although the illness is terminal, efforts at suicide prevention are appropriate to allow patients to rationally evaluate alternatives to treatment, to
integrate their lives in terms of financial and other planning, and to
allow resolution of personal relationships with family and friends. '24
Confining aid in dying only to competent persons, however, has
serious drawbacks. We allow advance directives in the form of living
wills and health care proxies to empower people to forego life sustaining efforts, precisely because people fear the undue suffering of life
prolongation when they are no longer competent. It would seem unjustified and unresponsive to public concerns to fail to include a provision
in any euthanasia bill for the prior directive and the designated proxy
decision maker. In addition, those with diseases like Alzheimer's, knowing they will lose mental competency in the future, may choose suicide
before incompetency sets in unless they have the ability to control their
fate through the device of advance instructions.
The never competent, for example, infants and those adults who
have never been mentally competent, pose special problems in any discussion of euthanasia. There is no way to draw upon such a person's
own beliefs and values or prior statements to conduct decision making
on their behalf. If euthanasia is to have any application, it would be to
relieve unbearable suffering, according to some objective standard that
would be recognizable by any reasonable person. The law could address
such cases in terms of strict standards and burdens of proof: a requirement of clear and convincing evidence of the medical condition, of the
futility of treatment, and the high degree of unavoidable pain.
Euthanasia for infants, if permitted, would likely be rare. Parents
124.
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of infants might be overcome with guilt if they consented to euthanasia,
but a few parents might see the option as a merciful shortening of an
otherwise doomed existence. If the alternative is literally watching the
infant wither and die slowly and fitfully, euthanasia may understanda125
bly appear to be the lesser evil.
Another possible restriction is to limit euthanasia to the terminally
ill whose death is imminent. If death is to come soon no matter what,
we may find little reason to require someone to endure suffering for the
length of time the dying process takes. A question exists as to whether
someone like Dr. Quill's patient-who rejected a difficult leukemia
treatment regimen that held out some hope for recovery-would be
considered terminally ill. If the rejection of treatment is not a part of
some irrational suicide plan, and the disease is terminal if not treated,
it would seem proper to categorize the refuser as terminally ill.
But it does little to further the goals of legalized euthanasia to
limit its use to the terminal patient near death. As Ronald Cranford
points out, if a person is
not close to death, but could possibly live for months or years with great suffering, then the case for active euthanasia becomes stronger. Physical conditions
such as intractable respiratory distress, diarrhea, itching, and vomiting are much
more important criteria for justifying active euthanasia than just one form of
suffering, physical pain.12 6

Limiting euthanasia to those near death would exclude all
Alzheimer's victims except for those in the final stage of that disease.
Limiting it to competent persons would disqualify those in the final
stage. Someone like Janet Adkins would be legally compelled to endure
the full brunt of Alzheimer's disease.
Some writers suggest a distinction between assisted suicide and active euthanasia.127 The former involves assistance like providing prescription drugs; the latter involves administering the lethal agent, by
injection or other means. The distinction may not be well grounded,
however. Where, for instance, does it leave the cancer patient who
clings to life until it is clear only suffering lies ahead, but then is too
physically debilitated to ingest the prescribed drugs? A patient like
Debbie fits this description. Would she be disqualified, assuming that
125.
126.
127.

Rachels, supra note 7, at 78-79.
Cranford, supra note 98, at 81.
Wanzer, supra note 3, at 848.
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she actually requested euthanasia, because she could not participate
sufficiently in the process?
Perhaps some of these problems could be limited by adopting a
suggestion of Steven Wolhandler that the least active method possible
be used.128 The more the individual participates, the clearer it is that
he has voluntarily chosen death. Such a rule also spares those rendering
assistance the heavier psychological burdens they may feel if the final
act is theirs.
Much more discussion and debate must precede precise formulation of formal standards and procedures. Difficulties of definition and
phrasing are not insuperable, however, if the desire for euthanasia is
perceived as just.
CONCLUSION

Doctor-assisted suicide, a suicide machine, a best-selling book on
how to kill yourself-all have unleashed a candid debate about euthanasia. Public reaction has revealed a willingness to accept the idea that
suicide can be a rational response to devastating illness, and that doctors should be allowed to aid persons who wish to end their lives.
This reaction has encouraged political efforts to legalize euthanasia. Many questions are raised by this suggested change in public policy-some moral, some philosophical, some religious and some pragmatic. Many writers have offered a bleak picture of the likely
consequences of a euthanasia policy. There are good reasons, however,
to believe that the calculated risks involved are manageable and that
the medical profession can adjust to a role it has played occasionally
and clandestinely in the past. The publication of Dr. Timothy Quill's
detailed account of an assisted suicide may show the medical profession
that aiding in a planned death can serve a patient's interests, and can
be done with humility and courage.
128. Steven J. Wolhandler, Note, Voluntary Active Euthanasiafor the Terminally Ill and
the Constitutional Right to Privacy, 69 CORNELL L. REv. 363, 382 (1984).

